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Tax MACs: A Study of M&A Termination
Rights Triggered by Material Adverse
Changes in Tax Law
HEATHER M. FIELD*
Abstract
A "Tax MAC" provision-one that triggers termination or other rights
upon a material adverse change in tax law-can be crucial to a business deal
if a change in tax law would change a party's interest in consummating the
deal, particularly at the specified price and on the articulated terms. Tax
MAC provisions may be particularly important when taxpayers make busi-
ness decisions in a political climate like today's, when tax laws could change
again, perhaps dramatically, if control of Congress and the White House
changes. Yet little has been written about Tax MAC provisions. In response,
I studied Tax MAC provisions included in publicly filed M&A agreements
from the past five years, focusing on provisions that could trigger termination
of the deal if tax laws change adversely. This Article details the findings of
that study. Specifically, this Article identifies the key elements of these Tax
MAC provisions (e.g., which changes constitute a "change in tax law" for
purposes of these provisions, what procedures are used to determine whether
the specified material adverse tax law change has occurred, what consequences
arise if such a change has occurred, and how the provisions overlap with any
provision requiring a general tax opinion in the transaction) and explains the
range of approaches taken on each element. This Article's analysis of the deal
points of Tax MAC provisions can inform the drafting and negotiation of a
wide variety of (even non-M&A-related) contractual provisions that would
alter the price, terms, or obligation to continue a transaction if tax laws
change. Thus, this Article should be instructive for lawyers seeking to help
clients proceed with desirable transactions that might otherwise be stymied
by uncertainty about possible future tax reforms. More generally, this Article
provides insights both into how contractual provisions are, and can be, used
*Eucalyptus Foundation Chair & Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings Col-
lege of the Law. Thanks to Alisha Patton (UC Hastings Law, Class of 2019) for valuable research
assistance, to Sarah Lawsky, Bill Lyons, David Cameron, and the student editors at The TxLaw-
yer for helpful comments, and to many others who provided feedback on a companion article
(Allocating T Transition Risk, forthcoming in the TLawRevici because that feedback also
informed my work on this Article.
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to manage deal risk posed by the possibility of future tax law reforms and into
deal-making practices when tax laws may change.
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I. Introduction
A tax law change can materially and adversely affect the tax consequences
of a pending deal. In response, some merger and acquisition (M&A) agree-
ments include a "Tax MAC" provision-a provision that triggers termination
(or other) rights upon a material adverse change in tax law. For example, it
was the Tax MAC provision in the acquisition agreement between Pfizer and
Allergan that enabled Pfizer to terminate their pending transaction in 2016
after the Treasury Department issued new inversion regulations.' Although
Tax MAC provisions are not particularly common, they can be crucial in a
business deal if a change in tax law would change a party's interest in con-
summating the deal, particularly at the specified price and on the articulated
terms. Tax MAC provisions enable taxpayers to specify which party to a deal
bears which consequences that might arise from a possible tax law change: If
a tax law change occurs, how will the terms of the deal change? Which party
will be obligated to continue with the deal despite the tax law change? And
which party will be able to terminate (and under precisely what circum-
stances)? Thus, taxpayers can use Tax MAC provisions in contracts to allocate
tax-transition risk among themselves.2 Tax MAC provisions and other similar
tax-transition, risk-shifting contractual provisions are useful in any situation
in which a taxpayer's economic decision is a function of tax law.3 As a result,
these provisions are likely to be increasingly important when taxpayers are
making decisions in a political climate like today's when tax laws could
change again, perhaps dramatically, if control of Congress and the White
House changes.4
1Press Release, Pfizer Announces Termination of Proposed Combination with Allergan
(Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.pizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detai/pfizer-announces
termination_of~proposed combination withallergan [https://perma.cc/J75U-V89T].
2 Seegenerally Heather M. Field, Allocating Tx Trnsition Risk, 73 TAx L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 2020) (manuscript at 18-30) (on file with author) (also discussing tax-transition, risk-shifting
contractual provisions used in derivative agreements, credit agreements, and municipal bond in-
dentures).
3 Id. (manuscript at 30-33).
' Id. (manuscript at 3, 5, 33, 37).
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Yet little has been written about Tax MAC clauses.' To help fill this gap,
I studied Tax MAC provisions included in publicly filed M&A agreements
from the past five years, focusing on provisions that could trigger termination
rights if an adverse tax law change occurs. This Article details the findings of
that study and provides insights into how Tax MAC clauses are used to man-
age deal risk posed by the possibility of future tax law changes. Specifically,
this Article identifies the key elements of the studied Tax MAC provisions
and discusses the range of approaches taken on each. As explained further
herein, the Tax MAC provisions vary significantly, including with respect to
which changes constitute a "change in tax law" for purposes of these provi-
sions, what adverse consequences constitute Tax MACs (i.e., material adverse
tax law changes that trigger the provision's consequences), what procedures
are used to determine whether a Tax MAC has occurred, what rights or ob-
ligations arise if a Tax MAC has occurred, the extent of overlap between a
Tax MAC provision and any general tax opinion required by the agreement,
and how a Tax MAC provision is disclosed in relevant SEC filings. Under-
standing this variability is useful because Tax MAC provisions are, in many
circumstances, carefully tailored to the concerns relevant to the particular deal
and tend to be employed in large, high-stakes matters. As a result, these pro-
visions present opportunities for nuanced bargaining and value-added law-
yering.
This study also has implications beyond the types of deals in which parties
might want to terminate a pending acquisition if tax laws change with adverse
effect. There are many other situations in which parties might want to use a
similarly bespoke tax-transition, risk-shifting provision to manage risks aris-
ing from the possibility of future tax law changes.6 For example, in an acqui-
sition of a private target company, parties might want to contract for a post-
closing purchase price adjustment if a tax law change affects the post-acqui-
sition value of a target company's net operating losses. In addition, parties to
a loan might want to contract for an adjustment to the loan's interest rate if
a tax law change limits the availability or value of interest deductions for the
5 See id (providing the literature's most comprehensive discussion of Tax MAC provisions
outside of this Article but not going into detail about their terms). On the other hand, there is
extensive literature, from both academics and practitioners, about "regular" MAC clauses. Seeintrq
Part II.
6 There are also contexts in which more standardized tax-transaction. risk-shifting agreements
are used, such as in over-the-counter derivatives and syndicated credit agreements, both of which
usually require payors to gross-up payees (among other consequences) if tax law changes increase
withholding taxes on the payments. See Field, supr note 2 (manuscript at 21-26). The insights
offered in this Article may be useful when revising standardized provisions or when drafting anew
a tax-transition, risk-shifting provision that is intended to be standardized across a category of
transactions. This Article's insights are, however, likely to be most useful when designing tax-tran-
sition, risk-shifting agreements that are bespoke-carefully tailored to the particular transaction
and the particular tax issue of concern.
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borrower or if a tax law change alters the tax rate applicable to the interest
received by the lender.7 To draft these and similar contractual provisions, the
parties (and their lawyers) need to determine which changes should constitute
"tax law changes" that could trigger the clause, what adverse consequence
should trigger the specified additional payments or other rights, what proce-
dures should be used to determine whether an adverse consequence arises,
and more. Thus, this Article's discussion of the key deal points in Tax MAC
termination provisions from M&A agreements should also inform the draft-
ing and negotiation of a wide variety of additional provisions that are in-
tended to alter the terms of a contract if tax laws change. More generally, this
Article provides insights into both strategies for empowering taxpayers to pro-
ceed with desirable transactions that might otherwise be stymied by uncer-
tainty about possible future tax reforms and deal-making practices when tax
laws may change.
Part II of this Article provides background on regular (i.e., nontax) MAC
clauses, and Part III explains the methodology for this study of Tax MAC
provisions. Then, Part IV discusses the findings of the study.
II. Background on MAC Clauses
As deal lawyers know, the overwhelming majority of M&A agreements
with delayed closings include a "material adverse change" (MAC) or "material
adverse effect" (MAE) provision.' These provisions, which this Article refers
to as "regular" MAC provisions (as opposed to "Tax" MAC provisions), can
confer a termination right (often called a "MAC Out") on one or more parties
if a material adverse change occurs after signing but before closing.' The ab-
' See id. (manuscript at 30-33) (discussing these examples and others and discussing, more
generally, that tax-transition, risk-shifting agreements can be useful anytime economic decisions
are a function of tax law).
'This Article will use the term "MAC" to refer to both "material adverse change" and "material
adverse effect" clauses. See NIXON PEABODY, NP 2017 MAC SURVEY 4 (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.nixonpeabody.com/-/media/Files/PDF-Others/mac-survey-2017-nixon-peabody.as
hx?la=en [https://perma.cc/NZU7-6YFP] [hereinafter NIXON PEABODY SURVEY] (taking the same
approach); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, UnderstandingMA'L4Cs:MorlHazardin Acquisi-
tions, 21 J.L.ECON. & ORG. 330, 330-31 n.3 (2005) (taking the same approach).
9 NIXON PEABODY SURVEY, supra note 8, at 4. SeegenerallyGilson &Schwartz, supra note 8
(discussing regular MAC provisions); Robert T. Miller, TheEconomics ofDealRisk:Allocating
Risk Through MAC Clauses inBusiness Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARYL. REV.
2007 (2009) (discussing regular MAC provisions);SAMUELC.THOMPSON, JR., MERGERS, AcQuI-
SITIONSANDTENDER OFFERS: LAW AND STRATEGIES-CORPORATE, SECURITIES,TAXATION, AN-
TITRUST, CROSS BORDER 2:12.4 (2010 & Supp. 2019) (same). Another function of the agree-
ment's definition of a "material adverse change" or "material adverse effect" is as a "qualiffier] to
various representations, warranties and covenants." NIXON PEABODY SURVEY, supra note 8, at 4.
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sence of a MAC is typically a condition to closing the M&A deal, and a ter-
mination right generally arises if the closing condition is not satisfied or
waived within a given time frame.10
Although the exact details of these regular MAC provisions vary because
the clauses tend to be heavily negotiated, they generally exclude adverse con-
sequences that arise from changes in laws or regulations (tax or otherwise)."
The majority also exclude adverse consequences that arise from changes in
"interpretation of laws by courts or government entities."12 As a result, regular
MAC provisions are typically of little help to a party concerned about the
adverse impact that a possible taxlawchangecould have on a deal. If a party
wants to be able to exit the transaction upon the occurrence of tax law change
that would materially and adversely affect the transaction or the party, a dif-
ferent provision is likely needed. Thus, concerned parties might want atax-
specific MAC-like provision to provide explicit termination or other rights if
a future tax law change causes a specified adverse consequence. Hence, some
deals include Tax MAC provisions in addition to regular MAC provisions.
III. Methodology
To find publicly filed M&A agreements with Tax MAC provisions, I used
Bloomberg to search EDGAR for plans of acquisition, reorganization, etc.13
filed within a recent five-year period." Then, I reviewed each agreement to
determine if it contained a Tax MAC clause. I culled the duplicate results"
and many false positives." To focus the study on termination rights triggered
10 See NIXON PEABODY SURVEY, supm note 8, at 4; THOMPSON, supr note 9, at § 2:12.4.
" For the year 2017, 98% of deals valued at $1 billion or more excluded changes in laws or
regulations from their MACs, as did 83% of all deals surveyed. NIXON PEABODY SURVEY, supm
note 8, at 11 ("[T]his MAC exception has consistently appeared in more than 80% of the agree-
ments reviewed in each of the [preceding] five years.").
12 Id. For the year 2017, 74% of deals valued at $1 billion or more excluded changes in inter-
pretation of laws by courts or government entities from their MACs, as did 57% of all deals sur-
veyed. Id. The percentage of all deals reviewed with this exception was down slightly in 2017, as
compared to 2016 (59%), 2014 (65%), and 2013 (62%). Id.
131 searched items attached to an SEC filing as an Exhibit 2. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (requir-
ing the filing of exhibits to SEC filings in accordance with "the number assigned to it in the exhibit
table" and including an exhibit table that provides that a "plan of acquisition, reorganization, ar-
rangement, liquidation or succession" should be designated as an Exhibit 2 to the relevant SEC
filing).
1 The initial five-year search period covered May 23, 2014, to May 23, 2019. This search
yielded 164 results. A subsequent search through February 5, 2020, yielded another 22 results.
The search query was "tax N/3 adverse N/3 change" OR "tax N/3 law N/3 change" OR "tax
change."
15 Duplicate results arose when more than one party to an agreement was required to file or
where amended versions of agreements were filed.
16 The most common false positives were agreements that (1) imposed covenants obligating the
parties to report/handle tax matters consistently with past practice or the intended tax treatment
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by a tax law change, I also set aside agreements in which the provision im-
posed mandatory consequences (e.g., gross-up payments) arising from a
change in tax law but could not lead to a unilateral termination right.17
Of the unique agreements from the search period in which a Tax MAC
could potentially lead to a termination right, 13 clearly provided a unilateral
termination right upon the occurrence of a Tax MAC (i.e., a "Tax MAC
Out"), either through an explicit clause in the agreement's termination sec-
tion or via a closing condition, which, if not satisfied by a particular date,
would allow for a termination right." These agreements, listed in Appendix
A, were the focus of my analysis.19 do not claim, however, to have found
every publicly filed M&A agreement from the last five years with a Tax MAC
of the transaction exceptas required by a change in tax law or both or (2) included the search terms
but the punctuation made it clear that the search terms were part of different clauses. False positives
also arose for a variety of other reasons, including provisions that (1) provided an exception to tax
indemnity obligations if a claim arose from a change in tax law; (2) specified whether the agree-
ment's references to "tax law" took into account any tax law changes arising after the date of the
agreement; (3) excluded changes that arose from a change in tax law from a representation that
there had been no material changes on a particular issue since a particular date; and (4) excluded
from the regular MAC/MAE definition any material adverse effects arising from a change in tax
law.
1 See, e.g., Assignment Agreement by and among Jazz Pharmaceuticals International II Lim-
ited, Sigma-Tau Pharmaceuticals Inc., Jazz Pharmaceuticals PLC, and Gentium S.P.A., § 2.7(b)(i),
at 9-10 (July 1, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1232524/00011931251429584
4/d768395dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/SNE7-542Q] (requiring gross-up payments if a change
in tax law increased the amount of certain taxes deducted from certain ongoing payments).
" Three agreements with Tax MAC Out provisions were found in the bring-down period after
the original five-year search period. See supra note 14. One of those agreements involved a party
(Ashford Inc.) that was also involved in two agreements with Tax MACs from the original search
period (one from 2015 and one from 2018). The relevant provisions in the later agreement (from
2019) were substantially similar to those in the second agreement (from 2018). Considering the
2019 agreement separately would add virtually nothing to the analysis provided based on the orig-
inal results. Thus, this Article does not discuss the 2019 Ashford Agreement. The two other agree-
ments with Tax MAC Outs found during the bring-down period were duplicates of the
McKesson/Change Healthcare Agreement from 2016, which was found in the original search. The
2016 McKesson/Change Healthcare Agreement was included as an exhibit to two 2020 filings
because McKesson was planning to undertake a split-off or spin-off of the joint venture formed
pursuant to the 2016 Agreement, to be followed by a merger of the split-off or spun-off company
with Change Healthcare. See Change Healthcare Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4) 26-31
(Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1756497/000119312520023378/d826
474ds4.htm [https://perma.cc/NXS2-6DX2] (summarizing the planned 2020 transactions and
their relationship to the transaction effectuated pursuant to the 2016 Agreement); PF2 SpinCo,
Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4) 26-31 (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ed-
gar/data/1790930/000119312520023439/d804285ds4.htm [https://perma.cc/VDW9-CG8Y]
(summarizing the planned 2020 transactions). Because these two agreements are duplicates of an
agreement already analyzed, this Article does not address them separately.
1 For agreements listed in the appendices, citations herein will use the short form titles of the
agreements, as listed in the appendices.
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Out. Because these provisions do not employ standardized language, the
search may have missed some. Nevertheless, the agreements identified should
provide a sample that is comprehensive enough to determine how these pro-
visions are (and could be) drafted, the variables on which they differ, and the
range of approaches taken on each variable.
The Tax MAC provision contained in several other agreements, listed in
Appendix B, did not provide a termination right but merely obligated the
parties to exert some level of effort to restructure the transaction in response
to a change in tax law.2 0 Under these provisions, the failure to comply with
the covenant to exert the requisite level of effort to restructure could lead to
a unilateral termination right, but the mere existence of a material adverse tax
law change did not.2 1 In some cases, these provisions were quite explicit that,
if a Tax MAC occurred and the parties were unable to restructure after exert-
ing the required effort, the tax law change did notentitle any party to termi-
nate unilaterally.2 2 The parties remained obligated to consummate the trans-
action unless the transaction was terminated pursuant to another termination
provision (e.g., mutual consent). Consequently, a party to the agreement bore
real risk that it would not be able to terminate the transaction if a materially
adverse tax law change occurred prior to closing.23 Although these provisions
could ultimately lead to a Tax MAC-related termination right (i.e., if a party
failed to exert sufficient effort to restructure as required by the agreement),
such a right was rather attenuated. Thus, for purposes of the analysis dis-
cussed herein (a portion of which examines the termination provisions them-
selves), I focused primarily on the 13 agreements with Tax MAC Outs, refer-
ring to the Tax MAC restructuring provisions only when they provided
additional insights beyond those provided by the Tax MAC Outs.
20 See, eg., Wright Medical/Tornier Agreement, § 2.14, at 22. One agreement contains both
a Tax MAC Out (relating to the transaction's tax treatment under sections 351, 367, and 368)
and a Tax MAC restructuring provision (relating to section 7874) that required the parties to take
certain steps to adjust the transaction to avoid the adverse result under section 7874, but which
did not, even if the adverse effect remained after such effort, trigger a unilateral termination right.
SeeAmcor/Bemis Agreement, % 7.1, 8.1(d), 8.1(j), at 71, 73, 74, and Exhibit A, conditions 3(d)
and 4(d), at A-3 to A-4 (allowing unilateral termination by either party if a tax law change pre-
vented the satisfaction of conditions related to sections 351, 367, and 368, but allowing termina-
tion only by mutual consent if an adverse tax law change prevented the parties from obtaining
specified assurance on whether New Holdco would be classified as a foreign or domestic corpora-
tion for U.S. federal income tax purposes). This Article's discussion of that agreement generally
focuses on the Tax MAC Out portion of the agreement.
21 See, eg., Wright Medical/Tornier Agreement, % 7.02(b), 7.03(b), 8.01(b)(i), 8.01(c)(i), at
80-83.
22 See, eg., Polycom/Mitel Agreement, § 7.13, at 109-10.
23 Again, the parties could agree to restructure or the parties could terminate pursuant to some
other provision (e.g., mutual consent), but the occurrence of the Tax MAC did not, by itself,
provide for a termination right.
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IV. Analysis of Results
The 13 agreements with Tax MAC Outs vary considerably. These trans-
actions involved companies in widely varying industries, including pharma-
ceuticals, software, gas/energy, and leisure/entertainment. Some transactions
were mergers of equals,2 4 but in others, there was a significant disparity be-
tween the sizes of the companies.25 The agreements were signed throughout
the five-year search period, with three signed in 2015, one signed in 2016,
five signed in 2017, and four signed in 2018. Three deals failed to close, but
the Tax MAC Out was the reason for termination in only one of those deals
(Pfizer/Allergan).26 Only one set of parties (Ashford Inc. and related enter-
prises and individuals) was involved in more than one deal with a Tax MAC
Out-one deal signed in 2015 but did not close, and one signed in 2018,
which did close. Nineteen different law firms (almost all Am Law 100 firms)
advised on these deals, with only two firms (Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP) advising on as many as three different deals
and four other firms advising on two deals each.
The substantial similarity of the language used in a few of the Tax MAC
Out provisions strongly suggests that these few provisions have common or-
igins. 2 7 The language similarities, together with the timing of the agreements,
24 See, e.g., Press Release, Linde pic Announces Satisfaction of Final Conditions to Close Busi-
ness Combination between Linde AG and Praxair (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.linde.com/
en/news-media/press-releases/2018/linde-plc-announces-satisfaction-of-nal-conditions-to-close-
business-combination-between-linde-ag-and-praxair [https://perma.cc/328U-3WDY] (describing
the transaction as a "merger of equals").
25 See, e.g., Press Release, Ensco plc to Acquire Atwood Oceanics, Inc. (May 30, 2017),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170530005599/en/Ensco-plc-Acquire-Atwood-
Oceanics [https://perma.cc/2XSN-2VS5] (explaining that the deal was an all-stock transaction af-
ter which "Ensco and Atwood shareholders will own approximately 69% and 31%, respectively,
of the outstanding shares of Ensco plc").
26 Ashford's 2015 transaction did not close. See Ashford Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K)
(March 24, 2017), https://sec.report/Document/0001604738-17-000020/ainc20l7remington8-
k.htm [https://perma.cc/SE32-4KKA] (explaining that the agreement was terminated because the
Service would not issue a private letter ruling, the receipt of which was a condition to the closing
of the transaction). The Clariant/Huntsman transaction also did not close. SeePress Release, Clar-
iant and Huntsman Jointly Decided to Abandon Planned Merger of Equals (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.clariant.com/en/Corporate/News/2017/10/Clariant-and-Huntsman-jointly-decided
-to-abandon-planned-Merger-of-Equals [https://perma.cc/M59B-ASMV] (explaining that the
transaction was terminated due to activist shareholder activity that created "too much uncertainty
as to whether Clariant will be able to secure the two-thirds shareholder approval that is required to
approve the transaction under Swiss law"). The Pfizer/Allergan transaction did not close because
Pfizer terminated pursuant to a Tax MAC Out provision. SeePfizer, supra note 1.
27 For example, the definitions of an "Adverse 7874 Tax Law Change" in the Ensco/Atwood
Agreement and the Clariant/Huntsman Agreement were identical other than a different level of
certainty required and a difference in whether an opinion was required to establish that the Tax
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also suggests that the language in some of the agreements may be traceable
from one deal to the next, often (but not always) through law firms that ad-
vised on multiple deals.28 Yet, even when a law firm was involved in multiple
deals, the Tax MAC provisions in those deals could be very different.29
Ultimately, notwithstanding some language similarities among a couple of
subsets of agreements, there is quite a bit of variation in the details of the Tax
MAC Out provisions themselves, as explained further below.
MAC provision had been triggered. SeeEnsco/Atwood Agreement, § 8.15, at 79; Clariant/Hunts-
man Agreement, § 9.5, at 78. Those definitions were substantially similar to the definition of "Ad-
verse Tax Law Change" in the Pfizer/Allergan Agreement. See Pfizer/Allergan Agreement, § 9.5,
at 100-01. All of those definitions were also quite similar to the definition of "Tax Law Change"
in the Amcor/Bemis Agreement, except that the Amcor/Bemis Agreement's Tax MAC was more
general because it did not identify a single Code section that, if changed, would be particularly
concerning to the parties. SeeAmcor/Bemis Agreement, § 9.5, at 91. Additionally, the Tax MAC
provisions in the Ashford 2015 Agreement and the Ashford 2018 Agreement were quite similar to
each other, although quite different from the Tax MAC provisions in other agreements. SeeAsh-
ford 2015 Agreement, Article I, at 2, § 10.01(b)(vii), 10.01(c)(vi), at 86, 87; Ashford 2018 Agree-
ment, Article I, at 2-3, § 10.01(b)(vii), 10.01(c)(vi), at 81, 82.
28 One version of a Tax MAC provision can likely be traced (1) from the Pzer/Allergan Agree-
ment signed in 2015, on which Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz and Cleary Gottlieb Steen &
Hamilton LLP advised, (2) to the Clariant/HuntsmanAgreement signed in 2017, onwhich Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP and Kirkland & Ellis LLP advised, and (3) to the Amcor/Bemis
Agreement signed in 2018, on which Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP and Kirkland &
Ellis LLP, again, advised. The Tax MAC provision in the Ensco/Atwood Agreement from 2017
(on which Latham & Watkins LLP and Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP advised) is so similar to
the other three that, although no overlapping law firms were involved, the Tax MAC provision
must have been based on either the Pfizer/Allergan Agreement or the Clariant/Huntsman Agree-
ment (the Amcor/Bemis Agreement was later). In addition, the similarity between the Ashford
2015 and Ashford 2018 Tax MAC Out provisions is not surprising because overlapping parties
(Ashford and several related parties) and overlapping counsel (Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP and
Baker Botts LLP) were involved in both Ashford transactions.
29 Compare INC Research/inVentiv Agreement, § 6.1(g), at 80 (specifying the change that
would trigger the Tax MAC clause) with Linde/Praxair Agreement, Annex I, at A-1, A-1-9 (defin-
ing "Adverse Tax Event" and "Tax Law Change") (Sullivan & Cromwell LLP advised on both).
Compare Pfizer/Allergan Agreement, % 8.1(i), 9.5, at 92, 100-01, (deining "Adverse Tax Law
Change"), with Harman/Symphony Agreement, § 12.01, at 91-92 (defining "Material Adverse
Effect," which integrated the Tax MAC provision into the regular MAC provision) (Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz advised on both). Of course, just because a single firm advised on multiple
matters does not mean that the same lawyers advised on the particular provisions. Thus, the dif-
ferences in approach could be attributable to the involvement of different lawyers, among a myriad
of other possible explanations.
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A. WhatTax Concerns Led Parties to Include Tax MAC Outs in Their
Agreements?
The Tax MAC Out provisions evinced concerns about a wide range of tax
issues, and some deals included Tax MAC Outs on multiple issues.30 Inver-
sions were a common focus of these clauses; five of the 13 deals were contin-
gent on the absence of tax law changes that would cause a post-transaction
party to be treated as U.S. domestic corporation, rather than a foreign corpo-
ration, for U.S. federal income tax purposes.31 Five other deals reflected the
parties' concern that tax law changes could prevent the transaction from qual-
ifying as a section 368 reorganization or as an exchange under section 351 (or
could lead to material gain recognition in a qualifying transaction) or both.3 2
The Tax MAC Out in one of these deals was also contingent on the absence
of tax law changes that could result in recognition of gain under section
367(a). 3 3 The Tax MAC Outs in two of these deals also involved tax law
changes that could cause certain dividends not to be qualified dividends.34
One deal involved Tax MAC Outs related to tax-free treatment under section
721, the application of the partnership disguised sale rules, and a section 355
30 See, e.g., McKesson/Change Healthcare Agreement, % 1.01, 9.01(a)(iv)-(vi), at 9, 19, 22,
98-99 (providing definitions of "Echo 721 Tax Opinion," "MCK 721 Tax Opinion," and "Sec-
tion 355(e) Tax Opinion" as related to Tax MAC Outs concerning tax issues under section 721,
partnership disguised sales rules, andsection 355). Because some deals involved multiple Tax MAC
Outs on multiple issues, the number of deals referenced in this Part totals more than 13.
3 1Ensco/Atwood Agreement, § 8.15, at 79 (defining "Adverse 7874 Tax Law Change"); Hay-
maker/One Spa World Agreement, § 1.1, at 9,19-20 (defining "Change in Tax Law" and "Ma-
terial Adverse Effect"); Clariant/Huntsman Agreement, § 9.5, at 78 (defining "Adverse 7874 Tax
Law Change"); Linde/Praxair Agreement, Annex I, at A-1, A-1-9 (defining "Adverse Tax Event"
and "Tax Law Change"); Pfizer/Allergan Agreement, § 9.5, at 100-01 (defining "Adverse Tax Law
Change"). Only one of the deals with a Tax MAC Out related to the tax consequences of an
inversion was signed during the Obama administration. Three others were signed in the second
quarter of 2017, and one signed in 2018 (i.e., after the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act took effect).
32Ashford 2015 Agreement, Article I, at 2, 14-15 (defining "Adverse Tax Change" and "Re-
mington Holder Adverse Tax Change"); Ashford 2018 Agreement, Article I, at 2,14-15 (defining
"Adverse Tax Change" and "PM Party Adverse Tax Change"); Amcor/Bemis Agreement, at 2, and
Exhibit A, conditions 3(d) and 4(d), at A-3 to A-4 (defining and providing a Tax MAC closing
condition related to the "Intended Tax Treatment"); INC Research/inVentivAgreement, § 6 .1(g),
at 80 (specifying the change that would trigger the Tax MAC clause); PharmAthene/Altimmune
Agreement, § 6 .3(g), at 75 (specifying the change that would trigger the Tax MAC clause).
As used herein, references to a "section" are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended (Code) unless otherwise indicated.
33Amcor/Bemis Agreement, at 2, and Exhibit A, conditions 3(d) and 4(d), at A-3 to A-4 (de-
fining and providing a Tax MAC closing condition related to the "Intended Tax Treatment").
34Ashford 2015 Agreement, Article I, at 14-15 (defining "Remington Holder Adverse Tax
Change"); Ashford 2018 Agreement, Article I, at 14-15 (defining "PM Party Adverse Tax
Change").
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Morris Trust issue.3 5 And one deal evinced a concern that tax law changes
could affect the availability and consequences of the renewable electricity pro-
duction credit under section 45.36
Although almost all the Tax MAC Out clauses identified the specific tax
issue of concern, one deal did not.37 The Tax MAC Out in that deal was
more general, reflecting a concern about any change in tax law that would
have a material adverse effect, as that term was defined in the agreement's
regular MAE clause.38
B. What Counts as a "Change in Tax Law?"
There is surprising variability as to what constituted a "change in tax law"
for purposes of triggering the Tax MAC Out provisions. The parties' choices
about which types of changes should be deemed as "changes in tax law" pre-
sumably reflected their assessments about the ways in which the tax laws that
concerned them were most likely to change (e.g., through congressional ac-
tion, administrative action, or judicial decisions) and their preferences about
how complete a change should be (e.g., whether bills, proposals, and changes
not yet effective were sufficient) before it could trigger the Tax MAC provi-
sion's termination rights. Fundamentally, all of these choices involve risk al-
location-which party bears the risks arising from which types of changes in
the tax law?
To implement these choices, the agreements reflected several different
drafting approaches. Some agreements did not explicitly state which specific
changes (e.g., regulations versus judicial decisions) constituted changes in tax
law that could trigger the Tax MAC Out, opting instead to rely only on the
defined terms "Tax" and "Law" used throughout the agreement (e.g., refer-
ring to a "change in Tax Law" when the terms "Tax" and "Law" were defined
elsewhere in the agreement).39 A couple of agreements were even less specific,
referring only to a nontax-specific "change in Law" (again using the term
"Law," which was defined elsewhere in the relevant agreement) that would
have the particular adverse tax impact.40 On the other hand, some agreements
35 McKesson/Change Healthcare Agreement, § 1.01, at 9, 19, 22 (defining "Echo 721 Tax
Opinion," "MCK721 Tax Opinion," and "Section 355(e) Tax Opinion").
36 NJR Agreement, § 1.1, at 3, 11 (defining "Change in Tax Law" and "Proposed Change in
Tax Law"). The deals with Tax MAC restructuring provisions also evinced concerns about possible
law changes relating to other specific tax issues, including Nevada business taxes (Lakes Entertain-
ment/Golden Gaming Agreement, § 5.24, at 72), the Irish tax rate (Strongbridge/Novo Nordisk
Agreement, § 7.06, at 39-40), and the allocation of partnership debt (NY REIT/JBG Debt
Maintenance Agreement, § 2.7, at 9-10).
37 Harman/Symphony Agreement, § 12.01, at 91-92 (definition of "Material Adverse Effect").
38 Id
39 See, eg., Ashford 2015 Agreement, Article I, at 2 (definition of "Adverse Tax Change").
40 See, eg., PharmAthene/Altimmune Agreement, § 6 .3(g), at 75.
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were more specific about the particular tax law changes (e.g., explicitly ad-
dressing whether proposed legislation could trigger the Tax MAC Out), but
even those agreements that clearly defined a "Change in Tax Law" (or other
similar defined term) often used the agreement's defined terms and, thus,
implicitly incorporated their definitions.4 1
1. Statutesand Bills
All agreements provided, whether explicitly or via the definitions of Tax
or Law or both, that changes to the Code would constitute a change that
could trigger the Tax MAC Outs. The majority of agreements referred gener-
ically to any "statute" or "code" and did not specifically limit the Tax MAC
trigger to a change to a particular Code section or sections.42 One agreement,
however, limited the relevant statutory changes to those that would amend
only one specific Code section (section 7874).4 Thus, that agreement's Tax
MAC Out would not be triggered by an amendment o another Code section
or the enactment of a new Code section, even if such an amendment or en-
actment would have resulted in an adverse effect that was substantially similar
to one that would otherwise trigger the Tax MAC Out.
The agreements take a less uniform approach to legislative proposals. Some
agreements did not mention bills at all and thus excluded any changes that
were contained only in bills that had not yet been enacted into law. Under
other agreements, a bill would constitute a change that could trigger the Tax
MAC Out if the bill had been passed in identical or substantially identical
form by both houses of Congress and the time for Presidential signature or
veto had not yet elapsed. Other agreements included bills at even earlier
stages, including a bill passed by either house of Congress as long as it has not
been defeated in the other house;46 a bill passed by either house of Congress
41 See, eg., Linde/Praxair Agreement, Annex I, at A-1-4, A-1-9 (using the "Law" defined term
in the definition of "Tax Law Change"). Busee Haymaker/One Spa World Agreement, § 1.1, at
9, 19-20 (not using "Tax" or "Law" defined terms in the definition of "Change in Tax Law").
42 See, e.g., Amcor/Benis Agreement, § 9.5, at 88, 91 (defining "Law" as referring to any statute
or code and "Tax Law Change" as not limited to any specific code section).
43 Haymaker/One Spa World Agreement, § 1.1, at 9 (defining "Change in Tax Law").
4 See, eg., INC Research/inVentiv Agreement, % 6 .1(g), 9.1, at 80, 101 (defining "Law," a
term used in the Tax MAC provision, to refer to provisions "issued, enacted, adopted, promul-
gated, implemented or otherwise put into effect by or under the authority of any Governmental
Entity"). Ifa change was merely reflected in a bill that had not yet been enacted, the statute would
not have yet changed.
4 See, e.g., Clariant/Huntsman Agreement, § 9.5, at 78 (providing, in the definition of "Ad-
verse 7874 Tax Law Change," that "substantially identical" meant in the form "such that a con-
ference committee is not required prior to submission of such legislation for the President's ap-
proval or veto").
46 See Linde/Praxair Agreement, Annex I, at A-1-9 (clause (ii) of the definition of "Tax Law
Change").
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that was reasonably likely to be enacted into law; 7 and even a bill that had
merely been reported out of the House Ways and Means Committee or Sen-
ate Finance Committee, if it was reasonably likely to be enacted into law."
In addition, one agreement provided that even a bill that had been vetoed by
the President would constitute a law change that could trigger the Tax MAC
Out as long as the period for overriding the veto had not yet elapsed.
2. Administrative/Regulatory Guidance
All agreements also included changes to, or issuance of, regulations or sub-
regulatory guidance as changes that could trigger the Tax MAC Outs. In
some cases, this was accomplished merely via the definition of the term
"Law", which typically included any "rule, regulation,. . . or requirement ...
of any Governmental Authority" or similar language.o In other cases, it was
accomplished more explicitly in the definition of "Adverse Tax Law Change"
(or similar term) or in the Tax MAC Out provision's language itself by in-
cluding a reference to any "interpretation" of applicable law, sometimes spe-
cifically referring to any interpretation "by a taxing authority,"" any "official"
interpretation,52 or any interpretation "set forth in published guidance."53
This sort of specific reference arguably included not only final and temporary
regulations but also proposed regulations because even proposed regulations
reflect the Treasury Department's (nonbinding) interpretation of the law and
proposed regulations are officially issued and published in the Federal Regis-
ter and Internal Revenue Bulletin.' Given that much of the action on inver-
sions had been in the form of regulations, it was not surprising that all of the
agreements with inversion-related Tax MAC Outs were explicit that a change
to regulations or other administrative guidance constituted a change in tax
law that could lead to a termination right.
4
7
NJR Agreement, § 1.1, at 11 (defining "Proposed Change in Tax Law").
41 Linde/Praxair Agreement, Annex I, at A-1-9 (clause (ii) of the definition of "Tax Law
Change").
1o See, eg., PharmAthene/Altimmune Agreement, § 9.14, at 98 (defining "Law", which was
incorporated into the Tax MAC Out provision in § 6 .3(g)).
51 See, e.g., Ashford 2015 Agreement, Article I, at 2 (defining "Adverse Tax Change").
52 See, e.g, INC Research/inVentivAgreement, § 6 .1(g), at 80.
53 See, e.g., Pfizer/AllerganAgreement, § 9.5, at 100-01 (defining "Adverse Tax Law Change").
54 The drafters of one agreement did, however, feel the need to explicitly provide that "for the
avoidance of doubt ... proposed regulations published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin" count as
"Law" that could trigger the Tax MAC Out. SeePfizer/Allergan Agreement, § 9.5, at 106 (defining
"Law").
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Some agreements provided more detail about sub-regulatory guidance. A
few agreements explicitly excluded IRS News Releases from possibly trigger-
ing the Tax MAC Out." One explicitly included "notices described in Sec-
tion 7805(b) of the Code" as guidance that, if issued or changed, could trigger
the Tax MAC Out." In addition, one agreement went into extensive detail
about the particular sub-regulatory guidance that could trigger the Tax MAC
Out, including a specific reference to memoranda or similar authority issued
by the IRS Large Business and International Division or by the IRS Chief
Counsel.1
The agreements typically did not specify which Code sections such guid-
ance needed to interpret to trigger the Tax MAC Out. One agreement, how-
ever, provided that the issuance or change of regulations or other administra-
tive guidance could trigger the Tax MAC Out only if interpreting section
7874." Another agreement included changes to regulations and administra-
tive guidance generally, but specifically excludedchanges made when finaliz-
ing particular proposed regulations from potentially triggering the Tax MAC
Out."
3. Judicial Decisions
All of the agreements arguably included judicial decisions in the types of
changes that could trigger a Tax MAC Out, but most did so implicitly
through a Tax MAC Out provision that was drafted using the defined term
"Law" (or "Applicable Law"), which was, in turn, defined to include such
things as orders, rulings,60 common law," and judicial interpretations.6 2
5 See, eg., Ensco/Atwood Agreement, § 8.15, at 79 (defining "Adverse 7874 Tax Law
Change").
56 Pfizer/Allergan Agreement, § 9.5, at 100-01, 106 (included in the definition of "Law" ("for
the avoidance of doubt"), which was used in the definition of "Adverse Tax Law Change").
57 NJR Agreement, § 1.1, at 3 (defining "Change in Tax Law" as including "any published IRS
guidance, notice, announcement, revenue ruling or revenue procedure, any technical advice mem-
orandum, examination, directive or similar authority issued by the IRS Large Business and Inter-
national division, and any published advice, advisory, or legal memorandum issued by IRS Chief
Counsel, that applies, advances or articulates a new or different interpretation or analysis of any
provision of the Code").
5 Haymaker/One Spa World Agreement, § 1.1, at 9 (defining "Change in Tax Law").
5 McKesson/Change Healthcare Agreement, § 9.01(a)(v)-(vi), at 98-99 (referring to "Pro-
posed Treasury Regulation sections 1.385-1 through 1.385-4 (or any portion thereof)").
60 See, e.g., Pfizer/Allergan Agreement, § 9.5, at 106, 110 (defining "Law" to include an "order"
or "ruling" by a "Relevant Authority," which included "courts and other judicial bodies" among
many other authorities).
61 See, eg., Ashford 2018 Agreement, Article I, at 8, 10 (defining "Law" to include "common
law" of any "Governmental Authority," which included courts and tribunals).
62 See, e.g., McKesson/Change Healthcare Agreement, § 1.01, at 2 (defining "Applicable
Law").
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Thus, taking into account the defined terms, changes to these judicial author-
ities arguably could trigger the Tax MAC Out in all of the agreements. I say
"arguably" because the conclusion that judicial decisions could trigger the
Tax MAC Outs in many of these agreements was implicit and relied on the
definition of the term "Law." In most agreements, there was nothing that
would undermine the conclusion that judicial decisions could be triggering
changes. In one agreement, however, the high degree of specificity with which
the agreement articulated the types of changes in tax law that could trigger
the Tax MAC Out (and which did not include any reference to courts or case
law) suggested that the parties might have intended to exclude judicial deci-
sions despite the fact that the "Tax Law Change" provision used the defined
term "Law," which did include judgments and orders.6 3 This potential ambi-
guity suggests that parties might want to be explicit about whether (or not)
judicial decisions could trigger Tax MAC Outs, particularly if a party is con-
cerned about an imminent judicial decision with potentially adverse implica-
tions.
Two agreements were quite explicit that judicial decisions were included
in the types of changes that could trigger the Tax MAC Out. Both agreements
included in the definition of "Change in Tax Law" decisions by federal courts
that change the interpretation of the tax law. One specifically listed particular
federal courts." The other did not specify particular courts but did limit ju-
dicial Tax MAC Out triggers by the substantive topic of the decision." These
agreements may provide sample language for anyone wishing to be explicit
about whether judicial decisions can trigger a Tax MAC Out.
4. Proposed Changes
Except as discussed above regarding bills and proposed regulations that are
set forth in published guidance, most agreements were silent regarding
whether proposed changes were sufficient "tax law changes" to trigger a ter-
mination right. Proposals to change the law are not law, and thus, for most
63 In the Linde/Praxair Agreement, the definition of "Tax Law Change" was four paragraphs
long, covering changes to the Code, certain bills that would change the Code, changes to admin-
istrative guidance set out in published guidance, and proposed changes in administrative guidance
that had been publicly announced, but did not include any reference whatsoever to courts, the
judicial branch, or case law. See Linde/Praxair Agreement, Annex I, at A-1-9.
64 NJR Agreement, § 1.1, at 3 (defining "Change in Tax Law" as including changes by the
"U.S. Tax Court, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, a U.S. District Court, a U.S. Court ofAppeals
or the U.S. Supreme Court").
65 Haymaker/One Spa World Agreement, § 1.1, at 9 (defining "Change in Tax Law" and re-
ferring only to decisions that "change[] or clarifly] the interpretation of section7874 [or the regu-
lations thereunder]").
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Tax MAC Outs, the mere proposal of a change would be insufficient to trig-
ger a termination right even if the change (were it to be enacted) would have
the specified adverse effect.
One agreement, however, explicitly treated any proposed statutory or reg-
ulatory change as a potential trigger for a Tax MAC Out, if the proposed
change "has been publicly announced (through whatever media)" by the Ser-
vice, the Treasury Department, the President, or any other executive agency"
and would, if "finalized and made effective," have the specified adverse ef-
fect. 67 The inclusion of proposed changes could lead to a termination right at
a relatively early point when the tax change proposal is rather inchoate and
no formal action has been taken to implement the proposal. This approach
increases flexibility for, and reduces tax-transition risk borne by, the party
that would have the termination right." On the other hand, including pro-
posed changes as a Tax MAC Out trigger increases deal risk for the other
parties by reducing the likelihood that the deal will close.'9
5. Changes ThatAre Not Yet Effective
A handful of agreements also explicitly provided that tax law changes that
were not yet effective could also trigger a Tax MAC Out.70 Without specific
language that an enacted-but-still-prospective change counts as a possible
trigger, ambiguity about whether such a change is sufficient to trigger the
termination right may lead to a dispute.7 ' Thus, if parties want the Tax MAC
" Linde/Praxair Agreement, Annex I, at A-1-9 (defining "Tax Law Change" as including "any
proposed change in, new official interpretation of, or change in official interpretation of, U.S. Fed-
eral tax Law, whether or not such proposed change is yet approved or effective, that has been
publicly announced (through whatever media) by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Depart-
ment of Treasury, President of the United States or other agency, arm or instrumentality of the
executive branch of the U.S. Federal government, or any of their agents or designees").
67 Id. at A-1 (defining "Adverse Tax Event").
61 Ofcourse, a party is not obligated to exercise a termination right.
61 If parties have aligned preferences about whether to terminate upon the occurrence of a tax
law change, then this may not be a problem.
70 See, eg., Clariant/Huntsman Agreement, § 9.5, at 78 (including, in the definition of "Ad-
verse 7874 Tax Law Change," both statutory and interpretive changes "whether or not such change
... is yet effective"); see alsoPharmAthene/Altimmune Agreement, § 9.14, at 98 (using somewhat
less explicit language but still stating that "enacted" laws constituted changes in tax laws that could
trigger the Tax MAC Out, which implied that it was unnecessary for a law to be effective, as long
as it had been enacted).
71The resolution of the question would likely depend on the careful parsing of the specific
contractual terms. Relevant information could include the verb tense of the Tax MAC Out trig-
gering condition (e.g., causes vs. will cause) and the point in time at which the tax analysis is de-
termined (e.g., when the transaction occurs vs. after the transaction). The former alternatives sug-
gest that the law may need to be presently in effect, or at least in effect as of the time the transaction
would occur, whereas the latter language alternatives are more open ended and could contemplate
an adverse effect that arises only at some point in the future when the change becomes effective.
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Out to be triggered by a change in law even if that change has a delayed or
phased-in effective date, they should make their intention explicit.
6. Specifing What Countsasa "Change in Tax Law"
Ultimately, when drafting a Tax MAC Out, it may be useful to specify
whether and under what conditions bills, other proposed changes, sub-regu-
latory guidance, judicial decisions, and changes that are not yet effective
ought to entitle a party to terminate. Of course, the importance of specificity
depends on the form in which a tax law change of concern is most likely to
be made, which will vary depending on the tax issue of concern.
C. HowIs the TaxMAC Out Triggered?
After identifying the tax issue of concern and determining whether a
change in tax law has occurred, the next step is to ascertain whether the tax
law change caused the specified adverse tax consequence (i.e., whether the
Tax MAC Out is triggered). Whether the Tax MAC Out is triggered depends
on, among other things, how the trigger is phrased, the level of confidence
that the trigger has occurred, and the procedures for determining whether the
Tax MAC Out has been triggered.
1. How Is the Trigger Phrased?
Different agreements phrase the Tax MAC Out trigger differently. Phras-
ing approaches that were found among the agreements included the follow-
ing:
1. A change in tax law has occurred that would (with some level of
confidence) cause the undesired tax treatment.72
Example: A change in tax law has occurred that should cause
the parent corporation to be treated as a domestic corporation
for U.S. federal income tax purposes.
If true, the Tax MAC Out is triggered. If false, no trigger.
2. A change in tax law has occurred that would (with some level of
confidence) cause the desired tax treatment NOT to result.73
72 See, e.g., Clariant/Huntsman Agreement, % 8.1(k), 9.5, at 72, 78.
73 See, e.g., Linde/Praxair Agreement, § 8.3(b)(iii), Annex I, at 52, A-1 (clause (b) in the defi-
nition of "Adverse Tax Event").
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Example: A change in tax law has occurred that should cause
the parent corporation not to be treated as a foreign corporation
for U.S. federal income tax purposes.
If true, the Tax MAC Out is triggered. If false, no trigger.
3. No change in tax law change has occurred that would (with some
level of confidence) cause the desired tax treatment not to result.7
Example: There has not been tax law change that should cause
the parent corporation not to be treated as a foreign corporation
for U.S. federal income tax purposes.
If true, no trigger. If false, the Tax MAC Out is triggered.
Phrasings 1, 2, and 3 are functionally equivalent7 if there are only two pos-
sible, mutually exclusive tax treatments-X and not X (e.g., foreign and do-
mestic),76 although Phrasings 1 and 2 require affirmative conclusions about
an identifiable change in law, whereas Phrasing 3 requires a conclusion about
the absence of a change, which may be more difficult to establish in some
situations.
A somewhat different phrasing was also observed in the agreements re-
viewed.
4. A change in tax law means that it is not the case that the desired tax
treatment would (with some level of confidence) result.7 7
Example: A change in tax law means that it is not the case that the
parent corporation should be treated as a foreign corporation for
U.S. federal income tax purposes.
If true, the Tax MAC Out is triggered. If false, no trigger.
Phrasing 4 can have a different meaning from Phrasings 1, 2, or 3 because,
for example, "it is not the case that the corporation should be treated as a
7 See, e.g., PharmAthene/Altimmune Agreement, § 6 .3(g), at 75.
75 This begins to feel like an LSAT logic game.
6 If there are three possible treatments (A, B, and C), saying "a change in law causes not A" is
not equivalent to saying "a change in law causes B," making Phrasings 2 and 3 potentially different
from Phrasing 1. In addition, Phrasing 1 would also be potentially different from Phrasings 2 and
3 if the desirable/undesirable options are not mutually exclusive (e.g., "qualify as a reorganization
under Section 368" and "recognize a material amount of gain" are not mutually exclusive because
a material amount of gain could be recognized in a qualifying section 368 reorganization if there
is ample boot).
7 See, eg., McKesson/Change Healthcare Agreement, § 9.01(a)(iv), at 98.
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foreign corporation" does not mean that "the corporation should be treated
as a domestic corporation." The former could merely mean that the corpora-
tion is only "more likely than not" to be treated as a foreign corporation (i.e.,
the same conclusion as the former, just with less than a "should" level of con-
fidence).
This discussion illustrates the fact that there can be subtle differences in
the wording of a trigger. Thus, the parties should be very clear about exactly
when they want the termination right to be triggered. For example, does the
party want to be able to terminate only if there is a less than 50% chance of
the desired result? Or does the party want to be able to terminate if there is
anything less than a 75% chance of the desired result? Once the parties agree
on the situations that will trigger the termination right, the language should
be drafted carefully so it captures those precise situations.
2. HowMuchConfidenceDoes the TriggerRequire?
Some of the Tax MAC Out triggers use traditional tax opinion levels to
state explicitly how much confidence there must be that the particular trig-
gering tax result has occurred.7 8 Some agreements used the word "should" as
in the examples in the prior section, 7others used the phrase "more likely
than not,"o and one used the word "will."" Of course, even the same confi-
dence level can lead to different results depending on how the trigger is
phrased,82 but because these particular confidence levels are well accepted
terms of art in the tax practitioner community, their use adds clarity to the
Tax MAC Out trigger.
Other triggers use somewhat more ambiguous language. Several used the
word "would," 8 3 and in those agreements it was not clear whether the parties
intended to (1) require a "will" level of confidence (understanding "would"
as a different verb tense of "will") or (2) merely use "would" as a conditional
verb (i.e., referring to a result that is dependent on the occurrence of a law
change) without connoting any particular level of confidence. One agreement
that used "would" expressly stated that "would ... is not intended to specify
a particular tax opinion level standard." 4 In these agreements and others that
71 See Robert P. Rothman, Tax Opinion Pactice, 64 TAX LAW. 301, 312-27 (2011) (describ-
ing tax opinion levels).
71 See, e.g., Amcor/Bemis Agreement, Exhibit A, conditions 3(d) and 4(d), at A-3 to A-4 (ex-
plicitly requiring "a 'should' (or higher) level of comfort").
" See, eg., Ensco/Atwood Agreement, § 8.15, at 79 (definition of"Adverse 7874 Tax Law
Change").
" INC Research/inVentivAgreement, § 6 .1(g), at 80 ("will not").
82 See supm Part IV.C.1 (illustrating how the use of "should" in two different trigger phrasings
can lead to substantively different triggers).
83 See, e.g., Clariant/Huntsman Agreement, § 9.5, at 78 ("Adverse 7874 Tax Law Change").
" Haymaker/One Spa World Agreement, § 1.1, at 9 (definition of"Change in Tax Law").
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did not use language that reflected particular tax opinion level standards, it
was unclear how certain the particular tax result must have been to trigger the
Tax MAC Outs."
If any change in law is expected to have reasonably clear consequences for
the tax treatment of the transaction, perhaps this language parsing is irrele-
vant, and it is unnecessary to specify a level of confidence for the trigger. On
the other hand, the less clear cut the results of a change are likely to be, the
more contentious a decision to exercise a Tax MAC Out right is likely to be.
Consequently, parties might want to include both a specific level of confi-
dence required to trigger the termination right and, as discussed in the next
Part, a procedure to determine whether the trigger has occurred with the req-
uisite level of confidence.
3. What Procedures Are Used to Determine Whether the Trigger Has
Occurred?
Some agreements specified a method to determine whether the Tax MAC
Out trigger had occurred, but others did not. Among the agreements that
specified a method, the receipt (or absence) of an opinion or advice from
counsel was the most common method of determining whether the Tax
MAC Out triggering event had occurred." There were some variations on
this method, with some agreements providing additional specificity about
which advisors' opinions count (e.g., only specified counsel, particular addi-
tional counsel sought pursuant to specific procedures, 7 only "nationally rec-
ognized counsel,"" or "accounting firm[s] that [are] nationally recognized""
or, more specifically, "Big 4 accounting firms" oor a combination of such
advisors). Interestingly, the Tax MAC Out in one agreement was triggered
not by a tax opinion about the impact of a change per se, but rather, the
determination of whether the trigger had occurred made "in the reasonable
8 See, eg., NJR Agreement, § 1.1, at 3 (defining "Change in Tax Law" as a change that "ma-
terially adversely affects" the specified tax treatment).
8 See, e.g., Clariant/Huntsman Agreement, § 9.5, at 78 (stating that an "Adverse 7874 Tax
Law Change" occurs if, in the opinion of nationally recognized U.S. tax counsel, a change in law
causes the undesirable result).
7 See, e.g., Amcor/Bemis Agreement, Exhibit A, conditions 3(d) and 4(d), at A-3 to A-4
(providing that, if one party's advisor could not opine/advise, the othcrpartywas entitled to seek
certain alternate counsel to opine instead).
" See, e.g., Pfizer/Allergan Agreement, § 9.5, at 100-01 (defining "Adverse Tax Law Change"
and referring to an opinion by "nationally recognized U.S. Tax counsel").
89See, eg., McKesson/Change Healthcare Agreement, § 1.01, at 2. This agreement defined
"Alternative Tax Opinion Advisor" who could render the opinions required in Sections 9.01(iv)-
(vi) to include a "law or accounting firm that is nationally recognized as an expert in federal income
Tax matters and reasonably acceptable [to the relevant party]."
9
"Amcor/Bemis Agreement, Exhibit A, conditions 3(d) and 4(d), at A-3 to A-4 (referring to a
"'Big 4' accounting firm or nationally recognized tax counsel").
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and good faith judgment of the Company, based on the written opinion of
outside counsel."9 1
Several agreements did not include specific procedures for determining
whether the Tax MAC Out trigger had occurred.92 In these cases, other pro-
visions of the agreement may nevertheless have provided guidance. For ex-
ample, the general dispute resolution procedures (if any) in the agreement
may have governed the resolution of a dispute whether the triggering event
had occurred.93 Ina ddition, the procedure to determine whether a Tax MAC
Out triggering event occurred may have followed the procedure (and the
same difficult-to-meet standard9 4) used for determining if a regular MAC
Out had occurred.9 Such provisions may, however, leave substantial uncer-
tainty when determining if the triggering event has occurred and whose judg-
ment is determinative. Thus, efforts to exercise a Tax MAC Out could de-
volve into expensive litigation like many disputes over the application of
regular MAC clauses.96
Detailed procedures for determining whether the triggering event has oc-
curred may not be necessary if the parties expect that any change in law would
lead to a relatively clear cut tax result or if the parties expect that the decision
by any party to exercise the Tax MAC Out would not be particularly conten-
tious. Otherwise, parties employing Tax MAC provisions should consider in-
cluding clear procedures that explain how the triggering event of a Tax MAC
91 PharmAthene/Altimmune Agreement, § 6 .3(g), at 75.
92 See, eg., INC Research/inVentivAgreement, § 6 .1(g), at 80.
93 For example, one agreement had a tax-specific dispute resolution procedure that applied to
the determination whether a Tax MAC Out triggering event had occurred, but the procedure was
contained in a document that did not appear to have been publicly filed. Linde/Praxair Agreement,
Annex I, at A-1, A--10 (defining an "Adverse Tax Event" and providing that the determination
of the trigger is "subject to the Tax Resolution Procedure," the definition of which referred to
another document).
9 See, eg., Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del.
Ch. 2008) (explaining that a party "faces a heavy burden when it attempts to invoke a material
adverse effect clause in order to avoid its obligation to close"); seealsoNixon Peabody LLP, Dela-
ware Chancey Court issuesrarec deciWon inding MaterialAdverse Effectjusti5 ing termination of
merger (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.nixonpeabody.com/-/media/Files/Alerts/2018-October/Ma-
terial-Adverse-Effect-ruling-Octi8.ashx [https://perma.cc/CD8S-ENEX] (discussing a "rare" case
"where a court has concluded that a Material Adverse Effect (MAE) existed that justified termina-
tion of a merger agreement" and noting that this case "may be the first time that a court in Dela-
ware has reached such a conclusion").
9 This is clearly the case when the Tax MAC is integrated into the regular MAC. See, eg.,
Harman/Symphony Agreement, § 12.01, at 91-92 (definition of "Material Adverse Effect").
96 See Miller, supra note 9, at 2007, 2012 (explaining that "MAC clauses have ... given rise to
more litigation than any other provision ofmerger agreements" and that "[p]arties to merger agree-
ments have often disagreed about whether one of them has suffered a MAC, and so MAC clauses
have resulted in litigation in which tremendous sums of money, sometimes tens of billions of dol-
lars, are at stake.").
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provision is determined and that identify the party whose judgment is deter-
minative.
D. What Consequences Arise Ifa Change in Tax Law Triggers a Tax
MAC?
Tax MAC Outs, by definition, provide a termination right if triggered,
but the agreements reviewed varied with respect to exactly how this right was
incorporated into the agreement. Some agreements imply included the Tax
MAC Out trigger as an explicit reason for termination.7 A more common
approach was to include, as a condition to the obligation of one or more of
the parties to close, a requirement that the tax law had not changed in a way
that triggered the Tax MAC provision." Then, if the transaction did not
close by a particular date (e.g., because the "no Tax MAC" closing condition
was neither satisfied nor waived), the agreements generally provided for a ter-
mination right." One agreement did both-including the Tax MAC Out
trigger both as a condition to close (which could lead to a termination right
if the transaction did not close by a particular date) and as an explicit termi-
nation right.100
One possible advantage of including the Tax MAC Out trigger as an ex-
plicit termination right rather than including the trigger as a condition to
closing that ultimately trickles through and leads to an eventual termination
right relates to the timing of the termination. The former generally allows
termination as soon as the Tax MAC Out trigger has occurred, while the
latter only allows termination once the set end date has occurred without
closing, even if that set date is months after the tax law change with the ad-
verse effect. Of course, the parties could agree to terminate earlier pursuant
to other termination provisions (e.g., mutual consent), but including the Tax
MAC Out trigger as an explicit reason to terminate may accelerate the exit
from a transaction doomed by an adverse tax change.
A couple of the agreements interposed one or more additional steps be-
tween the adverse tax change and termination. For example, the Tax MAC
Out trigger in one agreement allowed each party to terminate "specified cov-
enants," but did not explicitly provide for termination of the entire agree-
ment.101 Nevertheless, the termination of the specified covenants generally
TiSee, eg., Ashford 2015 Agreement, § 10.01(b)(vii), (c)(vi), at 86, 87.
See, eg., Ensco/Atwood Agreement, § 6.1(g), at 68. The exact phrasing of the closing con-
dition varied, as did the method for determining whether the closing condition was satisfied or
not. See supra Part IV.C.
" See, eg., Ensco/Atwood Agreement, § 7.1(b), at 69-70.
100 Clariant/Huntsman Agreement, % 7.1(f), at 70 (closing condition), 8.1(k), at 72 (termina-
tion provision).
101 Linde/Praxair Agreement, § 8.3(b)(iii), at 52 (allowing termination of the "Specified Cove-
nants" if an "Adverse Tax Event" occurs).
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relieved the parties from their obligations to take certain steps (e.g., obtain
regulatory approvals for the transaction) that, if not taken, would likely cause
closing conditions not to be satisfied, thereby leading to termination rights.10 2
Another agreement included an obligation to work in good faith to restruc-
ture the transaction to avoid the adverse tax consequence resulting from the
tax law change.103 This agreement provided that a closing condition was not
satisfied and a termination right was triggered only if the adverse tax conse-
quences still existed after such restructuring efforts. 10 4
Several other agreements included covenants obligating the parties to exert
some level of effort to restructure or otherwise alter the transaction to avoid
adverse tax consequences that arose because of a tax law change.10' The pro-
visions in those agreements differed from the Tax MAC Out provisions dis-
cussed in the prior paragraph because, under these other agreements, the fail-
ure to avoid the adverse tax consequence (after appropriate efforts) cId not
lead to a termination right.10 6 Some agreements were quite explicit about
this.107 Thus, as explained in Part III, although these agreements could tech-
nically lead to a termination right if the parties failed to comply with the
102 Id. (for example, cancellation of specified covenants relieved the parties of the obligation (in
§6.4 (c)(i)) to provide information to governmental authorities needed to obtain antitrust approv-
als, and if antitrust approvals were denied, the agreement could be terminated (§ 8.3(a)(v)). See
alsoPraxair, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 203-05 (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/884905/000119312517259883/d405553ddefml4a.htm [ tps://perma.cc/
CJ9F-J9TN] [hereinafter Praxair Proxy Statement] (explaining how an adverse tax change could
ultimately lead to closing conditions not being satisfied, thereby leading to possible termination).
1 03 Amcor/Bemis Agreement, § 6.14, at 70-71.
10 Id. % 7.1, 8.1(d), at 71, 73, Exhibit A, conditions 3(d) & 4(d), at A-3 to A-4 (conditions to
closing are not satisfied and either party has a termination right if, after good faith discussions
about restructuring, tax advisors cannot opine that no tax law change causes the transaction to fail
to qualify for specific favorable treatment under sections 368, 351, and 367(a)). This agreement
also contained a termination right, "by mutual consent," if a tax law change prevented, after good
faith discussion about restructuring either party from obtaining an opinion/written advice sought
by that party concerning section 7874. Id. % 6.14, 8.1(j), at 70-71, 74. With respect to section
7874, a tax law change that adversely affected the foreign/domestic status of the post-transaction
parent corporation did notprovide either party with a unilateral termination right. The tax change
provision related to section 7874 was thus more similar to the Tax MAC restructuring provisions
discussed in the next paragraph of the text. See supra note 20 (explaining that the Amcor/Bemis
Agreement had both a Tax MAC Out and a Tax MAC restructuring provision).
105ee, e.g., Wright Medical/Tornier Agreement, § 2.14, at 22 (upon a "change in Tax Law,
the parties agree to reasonably cooperate" to restructure); see also Appendix B (listing agreements
with similar provisions).
106 See, e.g., Strongbridge/Novo Nordisk Agreement, § 7.06, at 39-40 (upon the specified ad-
verse tax law change, parties "shall make commercially reasonable efforts to restructure," but the
change did not trigger a termination right).
107 See, e.g., Polycom/Mitel Agreement, § 7.13, at 109-10 (obligating a party to "consider in
good faith" a proposed restructuring to mitigate the consequences of a "Section 7874 Event,"
which included tax law changes that resulted in the parent corporation being treated as a domestic
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covenant to exert the specified efforts to avoid the adverse tax consequences
of a tax law change (e.g., failing to negotiate in good faith about restructur-
ing), that termination right was rather attenuated and quite unlikely to be
triggered. As a result, this Article does not treat these agreements as including
a Tax MAC Out.
Nevertheless, it is useful to note that Tax MAC provisions need not trigger
exit rights. Adverse tax law changes can also trigger obligations to exert efforts
to restructure the transaction, obligations to increase the amount of consid-
eration, or obligations to make gross-up/indemnification payments,"o or a
wide variety of other rights or obligations. The variety of possible conse-
quences that could be triggered by the occurrence of an adverse tax law
change allows for extrapolation from this Article's discussion of Tax MAC
Outs to any additional provision that is intended to alter the terms of a con-
tract if tax laws change.109
E. How (IfatAll) Does the TaxMAC Out Overlap witha General Tax
Opinion Requirement?
Many deals require a tax opinion that the transaction qualifies for the in-
tended tax treatment. Often, this type of "general" tax opinion provision (i.e.,
requiring an opinion that addresses the tax consequences in general, and not
solely as a result of changes in tax law) is a condition to closing the transac-
tion.110 In those cases, a party's inability to obtain a general opinion about
the desired tax treatment can prevent closing and lead to termination, regard-
less of whether that inability arises from the laws or facts as they existed prior
to signing or from a change in law or a change in facts that arises between the
time of signing and closing. As a result, a general tax opinion that is required
as a condition to closing generally allows for termination if there is a material
adverse change in tax law relating to the topic of the opinion (i.e., a Tax MAC
Out trigger) or if there are any other problems whatsoever that prevent the
tax opinion from being rendered.
Thus, a general tax opinion required as a condition to closing implicitly
provides a Tax MAC Out on the topic of the opinion. Accordingly, it is useful
to understand the following: (1) whether deals with explicit Tax MAC Out
provisions also included general tax opinions as a condition to closing (or
corporation, but explicitly stating that neither party had "any right to avoid or delay Closing or
terminate this agreement as a result of such Section 7874 Event").
"o See, e.g., Strongbridge/Novo Nordisk Agreement, % 1.01, 9.02(iv), at 4, 42 (providing that,
in addition to triggering an obligation to exert a certain level of effort to restructure, an adverse tax
law change triggered a gross-up/indemnification obligation).
'1 Most of the considerations discussed herein (particularly in Parts IV.A through IV.C and
IV.F) are relevant to the design of such additional provisions.
110 refer to a "general" tax opinion to distinguish it from an opinion that relates only to the
impact of a change in law between the time of signing and closing. See supra Part IV.C.3 (discuss-
ing opinions about tax law changes).
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otherwise); (2) if so, the extent to which the Tax MAC Out provision and
the general tax opinion provision overlapped; and (3) when (and why) a party
might opt for one, the other, or both. The short answers are that (1) some,
but far from all, deals with Tax MAC Out provisions also included general
tax opinion provisions; (2) when a deal involved both types of provisions,
there was usually a difference regarding the functions of the two provisions
(e.g., they addressed ifferent issues, conferred rights on different parties, or
spoke as of different points in time); and (3) the choice about whether to opt
for one, the other, or both likely depended on the risk allocation decisions
made by the parties and on counsel's willingness to render opinions. Exam-
ining the agreements provides greater insight.
1. General Tax Opinionasa Condition to Close, butNo Explicit Tax
MACOut
Many agreements include a general tax opinion as a condition to closing
and do not include an explicit Tax MAC Out."' This is not surprising be-
cause, as explained above, a general tax opinion closing condition provides all
of the risk protection provided by an explicit Tax MAC Out covering the
same topic and parties (i.e., the ability to exit the transaction if the law
changes in a way that adversely affects the particularly tax analysis), and more
(i.e., the ability to exit the transaction if any problems with the tax analysis
arise for reasons other than a change in tax law). This may be one reason why
the search for explicit Tax MAC Out provisions yielded so few results-an
explicit Tax MAC Out provision is not needed in many cases because many
deals already include a general tax opinion (on the same tax issue, for the same
parties, etc.) as a condition to closing.
2. Botha General Tax Opinionasa Condition to Closeandan Explicit
TaxMACOut
Some agreements included both a general tax opinion as a condition to
closing and an explicit Tax MAC Out, but the general tax opinion provision
and the explicit Tax MAC Out typically differed in an important way. In a
few of these agreements, the tax opinion closing condition and the Tax MAC
... See, e.g., Agreement and Plan of Merger and Reorganization Among SendGrid, Inc., Twilio
Inc. and Topaz Merger Subsidiary, Inc. % 6.2(d), 6.3(d), at 66, 67 (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1477425/00011046591806223 4/al8-36735_1ex2dl.
htm#Exhibit21 015801 [https://perma.cc/73VS-URBZ] (requiring, as conditions to Send-
Grid's and Twilio's obligations to close, their receipt of tax opinions from their respective counsel,
to the effect that the merger "will qualify as a 'reorganization'within the meaning of Section 368(a)
of the Code" but not including an explicit Tax MAC Out provision).
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Out provision addressed different tax issues.1 12 In such cases, a party presum-
ably made a decision that, for one tax issue (e.g., section 368 reorganization
qualification), it wanted the extra risk protection offered by the general tax
opinion condition to closing, but for another issue (e.g., domestic/foreign
classification of a corporation after an intended inversion), it was comfortable
with the additional risk of the Tax MAC Out-only strategy.113
In some deals with both a general tax opinion closing condition and an
explicit Tax MAC Out, the tax issue addressed by both provisions was the
same, but the provisions differed in other, often subtle, ways. For example,
the provisions conferred termination rights on different parties 11 4 or ad-
dressed the tax consequences of different parties."' In other agreements, the
provisions covered slightly different steps in a multi-step transaction 1 16 or re-
quired different levels of confidence for the relevant determinations. 117 Fur-
ther, the timing of the termination rights conferred by the provisions in some
agreements was different (e.g., a Tax MAC Out could allow termination im-
mediately after any tax change, whereas a general tax opinion closing condi-
tion might only allow termination once a set date had passed without clos-
ing)." There could also be other similarly subtle differences that lead parties
to include both an explicit Tax MAC Out and a general tax opinion closing
112 See, e.g., Clariant/Huntsman Agreement, % 7.1(f), 7.3(c), 8.1(k), at 70, 71, 72 (Tax MAC
Out on foreign/domestic treatment ofpost-transaction corporation and general tax opinion closing
condition on qualification of the transaction under section 368 and gain recognition under section
367(a)).
113 See infra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
114 See, e.g., McKesson/Change Healthcare Agreement, % 7.03(g), 9.01(a)(v), at 90, 98 (gen-
eral tax opinion closing condition allowed termination by only one party, but Tax MAC Out
(relating to the same issue/analysis) allowed termination by that party and another).
115 See, eg., Ashford 2018 Agreement, Article I, at 14-15, and § 8.03(j)(iii), at 78-79 (general
tax opinion closing condition was only concerned with the tax consequences to two individuals,
but the Tax MAC Out on the same basic tax issue was also concerned with the tax consequences
to several additional parties).
116 See, e.g, id. (Tax MAC Out included income/gain recognition consequences of the "PM
Formation Agreement" in addition to the consequences of certain other transactions, but general
tax opinion condition to closing did not).
17 See, eg., Ashford 2015 Agreement, Article I, at 2, § 8.03(j), at 83 (providing that the general
tax opinion closing condition required a conclusion at the "more likely than not" level, but the
Tax MAC Out used "would" language).
118 See, e.g., McKesson/Change Healthcare Agreement, % 7.03(g), 9.01(a)(ii), 9.01(a)(v), at
90, 97, 98 (failure to satisfy the general tax opinion closing condition triggered a unilateral termi-
nation right by either party only after a specified date had occurred without closing, whereas the
Tax MAC Out provisions triggered unilateral termination rights as soon as the law change oc-
curred (and specified additional steps were taken)); seealso supra Part IV.D (discussing the differ-
ence between use of closing conditions and explicit termination provisions).
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condition on the same tax issue. All of these situations typically involve nu-
anced choices about exactly which tax-related deal risks each party is willing
to bear.
It is also possible that parties might want to include both types of provi-
sions, even if the explicit Tax MAC Out provision does not cover any situa-
tion that is not already covered by the general closing condition tax opinion,
a so-called "belt and suspenders" approach.
3. Explicit TaxMAC Out, butNo Genend Tax Opinionasa
Condition to Close
a. In Genend. Some agreements included an explicit Tax MAC Out
but did not include a general tax opinion as a closing condition."' The use
of this approach was likely driven by at least two factors: counsel's willingness
to opine and the parties' risk allocation decisions.
There may be issues on which counsel does not feel comfortable giving a
general tax opinion, in which case having such an opinion would not be an
option. This could be because the tax issue of concern is the ongoing tax
treatment for the parties after the closing (e.g., foreign or domestic treatment
of a corporation, availability of post-transaction credits) rather than the tax
treatment of closing of the deal itself (which is a more common subject of
opinions) or because the analysis depends on material facts that are only
known after (not at) closing (and with respect to which counsel cannot obtain
sufficient assurance in advance of closing), among other reasons. Even in
these situations, however, counsel might be more willing to opine about
whether the law changed after signing in a way that is likely to affect the tax
analysis; such an opinion is much more discrete. These concerns may help
explain why, for example, none of the reviewed deals included a general tax
opinion closing condition on the post-transaction domestic/foreign status of
a corporation or on the post-transaction availability of certain credits, despite
including Tax MAC Outs on these topics.120
A party may also opt to proceed with only a Tax MAC Out and no general
tax opinion closing condition if, taking into account all of the other deal
"19See, e.g, INC Research/inVentivAgreement, § 6 .1(g), at 80 (Tax MAC Out relating to the
transaction's qualification as a reorganization under section 368); INC Research Holdings, Inc.,
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 30 (June 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal
1610950/000119312517220226/d402308ddefml4a.htm [https://perma.cc/8KN7-XFXT] (stat-
ing that no opinion or private letter ruling on the transaction's qualification as a reorganization
under section 368 was required as a condition to closing, but disclosing the Tax MAC Out on the
same issue).
120 See, e.g., Ensco/Atwood Agreement, % 6 .1(g), 8.15, at 68,79 (Tax MAC Out but no gen-
eral tax opinion closing condition relating to the foreign/domestic status of the post-transaction
corporation); NJR Agreement, § 6.1(h), at 44 (Tax MAC Out but no general tax opinion closing
condition relating to the availability of energy production tax credits post-transaction).
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terms (including price), the party is willing to bear the additional risk that
accompanies a narrower termination right (i.e., being able to terminate only
if the desired tax treatment fails due to a change in law but not due to any
other reason).1 21 The party may conclude that this additional risk (i.e., that
the desired tax treatment fails for a reason other than a change in law) is min-
imal, such that the party is willing to bear it. This decision would likely be
informed by tax analysis performed by that party's counsel prior to signing.
Presumably, the party's counsel analyzed the tax treatment of the transaction
under the laws and facts that existed through the time of signing the agree-
ment, doing whatever diligence and securing whatever representations, war-
ranties, and covenants were needed to give the party sufficient confidence in
the tax treatment to proceed.122
b. General Tax Opinion Included, ButNotasa Condition to Close.
Some deals that included an explicit Tax MAC Out and lacked a general tax
opinion closing condition, still involved a general tax opinion-just not as a
condition to close.123 The reason for adopting such an approach may relate
to when the relevant determinations are made. For example, in some trans-
actions, a general tax opinion was rendered at a time priorto the closing (e.g.,
no later than the date of the proxy/prospectus), but the Tax MAC Out (on
the same issue as the general tax opinion) continued to apply and could have
triggered a termination right for the full period until closing.124 In these situ-
ations, the general tax opinion presumably provided the relevant party (and
121The other party may be willing to pay more (or accept less) in the deal because there is a
lower risk that the deal will be terminated given the first party's more limited exit rights.
122 These deals often included representations from the parties relevant to the tax analysis on the
issue subject to the Tax MAC Out, covenants that the parties would not take actions that would
cause the transactions not to qualify for the favorable tax treatment that was the subject of the Tax
MAC Out, or language in the agreement or in the relevant publicly filed disclosure document to
the effect that the parties intended or expected the transaction to qualify for the favorable tax treat-
ment that was the subject of the Tax MAC Out. See, e.g., Ensco/Atwood Agreement, § 5.15, at
64 (covenant requiring parties to provide certificates with representations establishing that the in-
version rules did not cause the parent corporation to be treated as a domestic corporation);
Pfizer/Allergan Agreement, § 6.14, at 87-88 (covenant not to take action that would cause section
7874 ownership threshold not to be met); Praxair Proxy Statement, supr note 102, at 496 (rele-
vant post-transaction corporation "is expected to be treated as a foreign corporation for U.S. federal
income tax purposes").
123 See supr Part IV.E.2 (discussing coverage differences that could lead a party to want both
an explicit Tax MAC Out and a general tax opinion condition).
124 See, e.g., Bemis Company, Inc., Proxy Statement/Prospectus (Schedule 14A) 5-6
(March 27, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/11199/000104746919001684 /a22
38139zdefml4a.htm [https://perma.cc/28DY-Z8NW] [hereinafter Bemis Company Proxy State-
ment] (explaining that, on March 25, 2019, Kirkland & Ellis rendered a will-level opinion that
the transaction qualified for the intended tax treatment, and noting that, as a condition to closing,
certain tax advisors must render an opinion at a should-level or higher that there had not been a
tax law change that would cause the transaction not to qualify for the intended tax treatment);
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any shareholders who must vote on the deal) confidence concerning the tax
treatment as of the date of the issuance of the opinion. The tax analysis could,
however, change between the issuance of the opinion and the closing. Thus,
the addition of the Tax MAC Out protected the party from adverse conse-
quences arising from changes in tax law that could occur in the remaining
period prior to closing.
Of course, this approach (with a general tax opinion issued prior to closing
and a Tax MAC Out covering the remaining time until closing) does not
provide as much protection for the party as would the inclusion of a general
tax opinion closing condition. Under the approach described in this Part, if
a problem with the tax analysis is discovered after the opinion is rendered but
before the closing, no termination right arises unless the problem is due to a
change in tax law. Nevertheless, the issuance of the general tax opinion prior
to the closing date may provide sufficient confidence for the party to proceed
despite having a more limited termination right for the period remaining be-
tween the issuance of the opinion and the closing.
4. Conclusion About Whether to Includea General Tax Opinion
Provision oran Explicit Tax MAC Out
Ultimately, if counsel is willing to render a general tax opinion on the rel-
evant tax issue, a party considering whether to request a general tax opinion
(perhaps as a condition to closing) or a Tax MAC Out should identify which
tax situations would warrant exiting the transaction and when they would be
willing to accept the risk of being obligated to continue the transaction de-
spite unfavorable tax results. If the key concern is that the law might change
between signing and closing, a Tax MAC Out might provide sufficient pro-
tection. If, however, a party is concerned about the impact of existing law,
existing (or unknown) facts, changes in facts between the time of signing and
closing, or counsel's analysis of any of these factors, the party might prefer a
general tax opinion as a condition to close if the party wants to retain the
ability to exit the transaction if any of these factors produces an undesirable
tax result.
Of course, there are many possible approaches to address these concerns.
One approach that provides broader exit rights (and less risk to a party that
might want to terminate) than a Tax MAC Out but narrower exit rights (and
more risk) than a general tax opinion closing condition involves a termination
right that arises upon a change, between signing and closing, in either the tax
Amcor/Bemis Agreement, § 7.1, at 71, Exhibit A, conditions 3(d) and 4(d), at A-3 to A-4 (requir-
ing, as a condition to closing, opinions that there had been no tax law change, the effect of which
would be to make the transaction not to qualify for the intended tax treatment).
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law or in the facts that results in the specified adverse impact on the tax anal-
ysis of the transaction.125 Alternatively (or in addition), the parties could pro-
vide that different termination triggers yield different termination payouts.
For example, the termination fee could be higher if the party terminates be-
cause of counsel's inability to render a general tax opinion that is a condition
to closing and lower if the party terminates pursuant to a Tax MAC Out. In
this situation, the party that might want to exit bears more deal risk than it
would have had the former termination fee been as low as the latter, but less
deal risk than it would have had there been no general tax opinion closing
condition at all. Ultimately, there are many permutations, and the right one
for a given deal depends on the tax issues, uncertainty of the tax analysis,
sources of that uncertainty, likelihood of changes in law or facts, the risk ap-
petites of the parties, and more.
F. How (fa All) Is the Tax MAC Ou tDiscussed in the Publicly Filed
Disclosure Documents?
The deals' publicly filed disclosure documents (whether just 8-Ks or also
proxy statements26) varied considerably as to whether and how they dis-
cussed the Tax MAC Out and the related tax issues. The documents range
from some proxy statements that discussed the Tax MAC Out extensively
and repeatedly1 27 to some 8-Ks that did not mention the Tax MAC Out at
all. 128
125 See, e.g., McKesson/Change Healthcare Agreement, % 9.01(a)(v), 9.01(a)(vi), at 98, 99
(providing a termination right because of a change in law or a change in facts outside the control
of the relevant parties, which resulted in the specified adverse tax consequence); see also id.
§ 9.01(a)(iv), at 98 (providing a termination right because of a change in law or the occurrence of
a "Tainting Acquisition" outside the control of the relevant party, which resulted in the specified
adverse tax consequence).
126 For purposes of this discussion, the reference to proxy statements includes any proxy state-
ment, proxy statement/prospectus, joint proxy statement/prospectus, or proxy statement/prospec-
tus/consent solicitation. This discussion of proxy statements also includes the preliminary joint
proxy statement/prospectus for the Pfizer/Allergan transaction, although no final document was
filed because the transaction was terminated.
127 See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. and Allergan plc, Preliminary Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus, 16, 24-
25, 78, 158-59, 168 (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1578845/000119
312516493703/d22420ds4.htm [https://perma.cc/T8S9-9CX8].
128 See, e.g., New Jersey Resources Corporation, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 21, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/356309/000120677418003240/njr3503991-8k.htm
[https://perma.cc/25XK-RCZW] [hereinafter NJRC Current Report].
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For every deal in which a proxy statement was filed, the Tax MAC Out
was discussed in the section of the proxy that explained the transaction agree-
ment's closing conditions or possible termination events.129 The proxy state-
ments varied, however, as to whether the Tax MAC Out was discussed else-
where in the document. Some proxy statements also discussed the Tax MAC
Out in the risk factor section, the tax disclosure, or the section discussing the
factors relevant to the parties' decision to undertake the transaction.1 30 In
other proxies, these additional sections often raised the tax issue of concern
(e.g., flagging the possibility that the post-transaction parent corporation
might be treated as a domestic corporation for federal income tax purposes),
but these sections did not specifically mention the Tax MAC Out (i.e., the
possibility that the deal might be terminated if the law changed in a way that
caused specified adverse tax consequences).13 1
For some of the transactions with Tax MAC Outs, no proxy statement was
filed, and only an 8-K was available. This was likely because no vote of public
shareholders was required or because the deal terminated before the proxy
129 See, e.g., Ensco plc & Atwood Oceanics Inc., Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus (Schedule
14A), 113 (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/8411/0001047469170053
17/a2233066zdefml4a.htm [https://perma.cc/HU85-3J8U] [hereinafter Ensco/Atwood Joint
Proxy Statement] (flagging, as a condition to closing the transaction, the absence ofa change in
law that would cause Ensco to be treated as a domestic corporation for U.S. tax purpose); Phar-
mAthene, Inc. & Altimmune Inc., Proxy Statement/Prospectus/Consent Solicitation, 151
(Mar.31,2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326190/000114420417018516/v46
3109_424b3.htm [https://perma.cc/S8ZK-YCJR] (mentioning the Tax MAC Out in the section
about conditions to closing).
130 See, e.g., Bemis Company Proxy Statement, sup note 124, at 5-6, 26-27, 62, 117, 126,
157-58 (mentioning in the risk factors section, the tax disclosure section, and the section discuss-
ing factors relevant to Amcor's decision to enter into the transaction, in addition to the section
discussing closing conditions, that a condition to closing the transaction was the absence of a tax
law change that would cause the transaction to fail to qualify for the intended tax treatment);
Praxair Proxy Statement, supr note 102, at 65, 204-05 (mentioning the Tax MAC Out in the
risk factors section and the section describing termination rights); id. at 102-08 (mentioning tax
in the section discussing factors relevant to entering into the deal, but not raising the specific in-
version-related tax concerns or the Tax MAC Out); id. at 494-501 (discussing, in the tax disclo-
sure, the tax issue of concern and noting, in bold caps, possible change in relevant tax law, but not
mentioning the possible termination right that could arise as a result of such a change).
131 See, eg., Ensco/Atwood Joint Proxy Statement, supr note 129, at 25-26 (discussing the
section 7874 concern in the risk factors and even noting that the relevant tax laws could change
with adverse effect, but not mentioning the termination right that could arise if the tax law did so
change); id. at 131-32 (tax disclosure taking the same approach).
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statement was filed. The 8-Ks announcing two of these deals mentioned the
Tax MAC Out,13 2 and the 8-K announcing two other deals did not.133
The different approaches to discussing the Tax MAC Outs in the public
filings likely reflected the parties' differing assessments about the likelihood
of the possible tax changes and how material the possible tax changes might
have been to an investor's decision whether to vote for the transaction (where
votes were solicited) or whether to buy, sell, or hold the stock of the disclosing
corporation.
V. Condusion
Uncertainty about future tax law changes can stymie desirable business
transactions. One way to manage that uncertainty is for the parties to a deal
to contract explicitly with respect to their rights and obligations if tax law
changes ultimately occur. Tax MAC Out provisions in M&A agreements
provide examples of this type of contracting, and because these provisions are
carefully tailored to the specific circumstances in which they are used, they
illustrate a wide range of possible approaches on key deal points. Thus, this
Article's study of the details of Tax MAC Out provisions offers guidance
about the design, drafting, and deployment of tax-transition, risk-shifting
provisions both in M&_A agreements and elsewhere. More generally, this
study provides insights into strategies for managing deal risk posed by the
possibility of future tax law changes and into deal-making practices when tax
laws may change.
132Change Healthcare Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Item 1.01 (July 5, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1444598/000119312516641593/d220020d8k.htm
[https://perma.cc/P5B6-DTBX]; Huntsman Corporation, Current Report (Form 8-K), Item 1.01
at 2 (May23, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089748/000104746917003559/
a2232239z8-k.htm [https://perma.cc/D3KB-ST63].
133 SeeNJRC Current Report, supra note 128; Harman International Industries, Incorporated,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/800459/
000119312515020336/ d857058d8k.htm [https://perma.cc/FPM9-YR75] (mentioning the gen-
eral MAC provision, but not the tax-specific portion).
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Appendix A-Agreements with Tax MAC Outs
Amcor/Bemis Agreement-Transaction Agreement by and among Amcor
Limited, Arctic Jersey Limited, Arctic Corp., and Bemis Company, Inc.
(dated as of Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/111
99/000110465918049859/al8-18341_1ex2d1.htm [https://perma.cc/
RDZ7-ZKCE].
Ashford 2015 Agreement-Acquisition Agreement between Archie Ben-
nett, Jr., Monty J. Bennett, Remington Holdings GP, LLC, Mark A.
Sharkey, Remington Holdings, LP, Ashford, Inc., Ashford Advisors, Inc.,
Remington Hospitality Management, Inc., Ashford GP Holdings I, LLC,
and Remington GP Holdings, LLC (dated as of Sept. 17, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1604738/0001104659150659
50/al5-19726_1ex2d1.htm [https://perma.cc/VUJ3-YXF7].
Ashford 2018 Agreement-Combination Agreement among Archie Ben-
nett, Jr., Monty J. Bennett, Remington Holdings, L.P., Remington Hold-
ings GP, LLC, Project Management LLC, MJB Investments, LP, Mark
A. Sharkey; Ashford, Inc., Ashford Holding Corp., and Ashford Merger
Sub Inc. (dated as of Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ed-
gar/data/1604738/0001104 65918022977/al8-9722_lex2dl.htm
[https://perma.cc/4H9D-Z2JQ].
Clariant/Huntsman Agreement-Agreement and Plan of Merger by and
among Clariant Ltd, HurricaneCyclone Corporation, and Huntsman
Corporation (dated as of May 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1089748/000104746917003559/a2232239zex-2_.htm
[https://perma.cc/N6LW-SFCZ].
Ensco/Atwood Agreement-Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among
Ensco PLC, Echo Merger Sub LLC, and Atwood Oceanics, Inc. (dated as
of May 29, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/314808/000
110465917036192/al7-14344_2ex2dl.htm [https://perma.cc/SR9N-
95FZ].
Harman/Symphony Agreement-Agreement and Plan of Merger by and
among Symphony Teleca Corporation, Harman International Industries,
Inc., Sabita Sub, Inc., and Symphony Technology Group, L.L.C., (dated
as of Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/800459/
000119312515020336/d857058dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/V6HD-
TQ391.
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Haymaker/One Spa World Agreement-Business Combination Agree-
ment by and among Steiner U.S. Holdings, Inc., Nemo (UK) Holdco,
Ltd, Steiner UK Limited, Steiner Management Services, LLC, Haymaker
Acquisition Corp., OneSpaWorld Holdings Limited, Dory US Merger
Sub, LLC, Dory Acquisition Sub, Limited, Dory Acquisition Sub, Inc.,
Dory Intermediate LLC, and, in its capacity as a Seller and as the Seller
Representative, Steiner Leisure Limited (dated as of Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1707306/0001193125183159
54/d598255dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/E3XW-AK22].
INC Research/inVentiv Agreement-Agreement and Plan of Merger by
and between Double Eagle Parent, Inc. ("inVentiv") and INC Research
Holdings, Inc. (dated as of May 10, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Ar-
chives/edgar/data/1610950/000119312517166114/d384591dex21.htm
[https://perma.cc/94KU-4W92].
Linde/Praxair Agreement-Business Combination Agreement by and
among Linde Aktiengesellschaft, Praxair, Inc., Zamalight PLC, Zamalight
Holdco LLC, and Zamalight Subco, Inc. (dated as of June 1, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/884905/00011931251719121
8/d506854dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/49DL-8N22].
McKesson/Change Healthcare Agreement-Agreement of Contribution
and Sale by and among PF2 NewCo LLC, PF2 NewCo Intermediate
Holdings, LLC, PF2 NewCo Holdings, LLC, McKesson Corporation,
HCIT Holdings, Inc., Change Healthcare, Inc., Change Aggregator L.P.,
and H&F Echo Holdings, L.P. (dated as of June 28, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/927653/00011931251664158
2/d221363dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/U5F4-ATNQ].
NJR Agreement-Membership Interest Purchase Agreement between NJR
Clean Energy Ventures II Corporation and SRIV Partnership, LLC (dated
as of Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/356309/
000120677418003240/njr3503991-ex21.htm [https://perma.cc/CG2Y-
KXH6].
Pfizer/Allergan Agreement-Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among
Pfizer, Inc., Allergan PLC and Watson Merger Sub Inc. (dated as of
Nov. 22, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/78003/00011
9312515385453/d70588dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/JZ2T-5L8T].
PharmAthene/Altimmune Agreement-Agreement and Plan of Merger
and Reorganization by and among PharmAthene, Inc., Mustang Merger
Sub Corp I Inc., Mustang Merger Sub II LLC, Altimmune, Inc., and
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Shareholder Representative Services LLC, as Securityholders' Representa-
tive (dated as of Jan 18, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1326190/000114420417002826/v4 57081_ex2-1.htm [https://perma.cc
/NEX4-L2R4].
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Appendix B-Agreements with Tax MAC Provisions Triggering
Efforts to Restructure
ACETO/Citron Agreement-Product Purchase Agreement by and among
Citron Pharma LLC, Lucid Pharma LLC, the direct and indirect equity
holders of sellers named herein, Romeo Charlie Acquisition I, LLC, Ro-
meo Charlie Acquisition II, LLC, ACETO Corporation and Vimal Ka-
vuru, as agent (dated as of Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Ar-
chives/edgar/data/2034/000157104916019347/tl600678_ex2-1.htm
[https://perma.cc/2PZC-ZKA4].
Lakes Entertainment/Golden Gaming-Agreement and Plan of Merger by
and among Lakes Entertainment Inc., LG Acquisition Corporation, Sar-
tini Gaming, Inc., ("Golden Gaming"), and The Blake L. Sartini and Del-
ise F. Sartini Family Trust (dated as of Jan. 25, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1071255/0001437749150012
19/ex2-1.htm[https://perma.cc/3D9X-BSKW].
NY REIT/JBG Debt Maintenance Agreement-Debt Maintenance
Agreement in Exhibit H to Master Combination Agreement by and
among New York REIT, Inc., New York Recovery Operating Partnership,
L.P., JBG Properties Inc., JBG/Operating Partners, L.P., and the Jaguar
Parties set forth on Schedule A (dated as of May 25, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1474464/0001104659161237
34 /al6-10302_4ex2d1.htm [https://perma.cc/8MS9-LRZVI.
Polycom/Mitel Agreement-Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among
Polycom, Inc., Mitel Networks Corporation, and Meteor Two, Inc.
(dated as of April 15, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1010552/000119312516544639/dl83833dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/
P6T8-3PMJ].
Strongbridge/Novo Nordisk Agreement-Macrilen Acquisition Agree-
ment between Novo Nordisk Healthcare AG and Strongbridge Bio-
pharma Public Limited Company (dated as of Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1634432/0001104659180651
43/al8-39298_1ex2d1.htm [https://perma.cc/4ECZ-7FRMI.
Wright Medical/Tornier Agreement-Agreement and Plan of Merger by
and among Tornier N.V., Trooper Holdings Inc., Trooper Merger Sub
Inc., and Wright Medical Group, Inc. (dated as of Oct. 27, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1492658/0001193125143833
36/d810468dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/RRQ8-LK6T].
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